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Russia's Post-Cold War Strategy -- the Putin Plan 
 
Reeling from the sudden collapse of the U.S.S.R., Boris Yeltsin’s Russia had no coherent 
approach to foreign policy and no global strategy. Its foreign policy, like its domestic policy, was 
sharply divided between those who looked to the West for support and guidance in transforming 
Russia into a more European country, and those who hoped for a restoration of, if not quite the 
USSR, then at least Russia’s status as a regional Great Power. The former view was exemplified 
by foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, who seemed ever in search of the Russian national interest. 
The latter view was the hallmark of his immediate successor, Yevgeni Primakov. 
 
The appointment of Vladimir Putin to succeed Yeltsin as president did not immediately resolve 
this conflict. Indeed, there is strong evidence suggesting that during his first term in office, Putin 
himself was ambivalent about which course to choose, and even considered the possibility of 
Russia eventually joining both the European Union and NATO.2 
 
He eventually decided, however, that neither option would be possible unless Russia ended its 
humiliating economic dependency on the West. Russia’s prosperity thus became a precondition 
for the restoration of the country’s freedom to act independently in international politics.   
                                                 
1 Nicolai N. Petro is professor of political science and currently holds the Silvia-Chandley Professor of Peace Studies and Nonviolence at the 
University of Rhode Island. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace 
Program for military leaders, Fort Carson, Colorado Springs, January 26-27, 2017.       
2 “’Putin asked NATO Secretary General George Robertson at their first meeting, in February 2000, when Russia would be able to join the 
alliance.’ Robertson was not prepared for the question”. Cited by Michael Weiss, “When Donald Trump Was More Anti-NATO Than Vladimir 
Putin”, The Daily Beast, 4 November, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/when-donald-trump-was-more-anti-nato-than-vladimir-putin 
(accessed 10 November 2016). 
A decade ago many Russian analysts concluded that the West’s efforts to preserve its global 
superiority would be futile and the emergence of a polycentric world was inevitable. To 
benefit from this transition Russia should adopt a strategy that combined great power realism 
and “traditional” Russian values. This strategy, first elaborated in Vladimir Putin’s Valdai 
Speech of 2013, is known as ‘Civilizational Realism’. 
 
This article describes the emergence of Russia’s new sense of self-worth, how and why Russia 
gradually lost faith in the West as a potential partner, and how, through the internal adoption 
and external projection of conservative multicultural values, Russia hopes to forge a new, and  
more pluralistic, world order. 




The key to restoring Russian greatness, as Putin saw it, lay in restoring the effectiveness of the 
state institutions that had so precipitously unraveled under Yeltsin. Some of the major reforms 
begun during Putin’s first term include: the temporary appointment of governors, reforming or 
moving unconstitutional regional laws, dramatically increasing funding for the judiciary, 
introducing new legal codes, strengthening of political parties, and reasserting state control over 
strategic sectors of the economy.3 It is a sign of the public’s growing confidence in the judicial 
system, that the number of persons turning to courts for redress of civil grievances has gone from 
one million in 1998, to six million in 2004, to ten million in 2012,4 to more than 17 million in 
2016.5 
 
By strengthening of state institutions, harmonizing local and federal legislation, and paying off 
foreign debt early, the ‘Putin Plan’, as it was later dubbed, sought to reverse the economic 
ravages of the Yeltsin years which, as economist Joseph Stiglitz notes, had reduced Russia’s 
industrial production almost 60%. By comparison, Stiglitz notes, the USSR’s industrial 
production under Nazi occupation fell only 24%.6 
 
A key aspect of the Putin Plan was to replace the deeply entrenched mentality of the Soviet 
system with an ideology appropriate to the needs of a democratic and globally competitive 
Russia. This new ideology was referred to as ‘sovereign democracy’. 
  
Sovereign democracy, according to Putin’s former deputy chief of staff and long time associate, 
Vladislav Surkov, describes Russia’s optimal political system—one that would allow the current 
generation to link the positive experiences of the Soviet past to the post-Soviet values that Russia 
needed to succeed in an economically integrated world. To achieve this goal, Surkov argued that 
the present generation must believe that it was the Russian people themselves who had rejected 
the Soviet system and embraced a democratic, European future. By casting the fall of 
communism as a victory of the Russian people, rather than a defeat of their old social system, 
sovereign democracy would allow Russians of all generations and political persuasions deal with 
the past in a sober and respectful manner, while simultaneously helping them to move beyond it.  
 
Surkov reasoned that the ability to define the past on their own terms would not only foster 
public unity; it would also help the country to pursue reforms in a manner consonant with its 
own political culture. To sum up Surkov’s view: to become a sovereign country Russia must 
become economically competitive; to be economically competitive it must be governed 
democratically, which means in a manner that reflects the traditions and values of the Russian 
people.7   
  
                                                 
3 Nicolai N. Petro, “The Great Transformation: How the Putin Plan Altered Russian Society”, ISPI Policy Brief no 132 (Institute for the Study of 
International Politics, Milan, Italy), May 2009, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1955176 (accessed 16 June 2009).  
4 Yuri Kolesov, “The Shadow of Judgement”, Vremya novostei, 19 October 2004. Cited in Johnson's Russia List no 8416, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 28 October 2004); Mikhail Barshchevsky, “Sudya po vsemu”, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 19 February 
2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/02/19/lebedev.html (accessed 26 February 2013).  
5 “Vserosiiskii s’ezd sudei”, Kremlin.ru, 6 December 2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53419 (accessed 16 December 2016).  
6 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002): 143. 
7 Vladislav Surkov, "Russkaya politicheskaya kultura: vzglyad iz utopii”, Kreml.org, 8 June 2007, 
http://www.kreml.org/opinions/152440881?mode=print> (accessed 16 June 2007). 
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The Putin Plan was spectacularly successful in restoring the Russian economy, and along with it 
Russia’s sense of well-being and confidence in the future. In 1999 Russian annual GDP per 
capita was 1,334 dollars. At its height at the end of 2012, it was 15,409 dollars--an eleven fold 
growth.4  In 2001, 27.3% of Russians lived below poverty. Ten years later it was below the EU 
average (16%).8 The combination of a robust social safety net, official unemployment of 5.2%, 
and an annual inflation rate at 2.5%, with which Russia entered 2018 goes a long way to 
explaining the ease with which Putin won re-election to a fourth term, even as economic growth 
has slowed dramatically during this third presidential term due to the imposition of external 
sanctions.9 
 
The Foreign Policy Implications of the Putin Plan 
 
As mentioned, the Putin Plan also had a specific foreign policy purpose—ending Russia’s 
dependence on external powers. Putin’s first foreign policy review, completed in June 2000, 
came to the conclusion that Russia was unable to adequately defend its national interests, 
because its dependence on foreign loans translated into a constraint on its sovereignty. Only by 
achieving economic independence could Russia have a relationship of equals with the West. 
 
In addition, according to Surkov, the idea of sovereign democracy implied that all nations should 
be free to choose their own social and political systems. Thus, from the outset, it presumes that 
multipolarity in international relations is to be preferred and that hegemony, be it military, 
economic, or cultural, would inevitably be a source of global instability and a potential threat to 
Russia. ‘We sometimes hear’, Surkov wrote, ‘that no one is interested in taking away our 
sovereignty (or that this is unreal), but the universal and daily need for resources and security is 
so great, and our supply of these is so rich, that excessive complacency here hardly seems 
appropriate’.10   
 
Because the Putin Plan and sovereign democracy evolved simultaneously, Russia’s economic 
success, the restoration of state capacity, and the return to certain pre-Soviet traditions all came 
to be seen as tied together. Originally envisioned as a means to restore Russia to the broader 
European family, albeit on its own terms, sovereign democracy, as it later turned out, could also 
serve as a framework for Russia’s burgeoning relations with non-Western powers.   
 
Russia Loses Faith in the West  
 
Despite a long tradition of suspicion of the West, capped by more than a half century of 
indoctrination by the Soviet regime, the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of 
the Warsaw Pact seemed to presage an end to Cold War divisions. The first inklings that this 
would not be, were revealed by the eastward expansion of NATO in the late 1990s.  
 
                                                 
4 Ben Aris, “Moscow Blog: A tale of two countries – Russia vs Ukraine”, bne Intellinews, 13 July 2017, http://www.intellinews.com/moscow-
blog-a-tale-of-two-countries-russia-vs-ukraine-1h17-125236/?source=ukraine (accessed 1 August 2017). 
8 Jon Hellevig, “Russia's Good Fortune: The Flat Tax Reform”, Russia Blog (archive), 28 March 2007, http://archive.is/3Upm (accessed 16 April 
2007). 
9 “Russian economy under Putin: Quality of life tripled, foreign debt fell 75%” RT.com, 27 January 2018, https://www.rt.com/business/417135-
putin-presidency-economic-growth-russia/ (accessed 30 January 2018). 
10 Vladislav Surkov, “Natsionalizatsiya budushchego”, Ekspert no 43, 20 November 2006,  
http://expert.ru/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_buduschego/ (accessed 19 December 2006). 
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The exact nature of what was agreed to then is still being hotly debated more than a quarter 
century later. Those involved in the negotiations on the Russian side insist that, on the eve of the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, all the principals agreed that the alliance would not be expanded 
even ‘an inch to the East’.11 Many, though not all, of those involved on the American side have a 
different recollection.12 Whatever the reality, NATO expansion has become symptomatic of the 
broader misunderstandings that have come to plague the post-Cold War era.  
 
Despite its lingering disappointment with NATO expansion, however, it is important to point out 
that during the early 2000s Russia still saw itself as part of the Western community of nations. In 
February 2000, when Putin was asked whether Russia was once again going to try and find its 
own ‘special path’, he famously replied: ‘There is nothing to find—everything has already been 
found. It is the path of democratic development. Of course, is an extremely diverse country, but 
we are part of Western European culture. This is, in fact, our value. Wherever our people may 
live, in the Far East, or in the South, we are Europeans.”13 For many in government. EU 
membership, at some point down the road, was deemed a foregone conclusion, a view the 
director of policy planning at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs clung to even as late as 
December 2010.14  
 
Yet, even in that early interview, Putin hinted that much would depend on how Europe 
responded to Russia’s aspirations. When his interviewer sarcastically remarked that, ‘All that’s 
left now, is for Europe to agree’, Putin replied: ‘We will strive to remain where geography and 
our spirit have placed us, but if we are pushed out, then we will be forced to seek other ties, and 
to bolster ourselves. That much should be obvious’.15   
  
Russia’s sense of aggrievement at NATO and the West became very apparent in February 2007, 
at the annual Munich Security Conference. In unusually candid language for a head of state, 
Putin laid out why he thought America’s ‘unipolar moment’ could not last, and urged his 
audience to consider whether the ‘absolute security’ that America sought was even possible in 
the modern world. He suggested that participants think about creating a new architecture of 
global security, one that would accommodate the many new international actors coming onto the 
world stage. The United States, Putin acknowledged, would obviously be first among equals in 
this new world, but no longer the global hegemon.16 
 
Putin’s Munich speech was widely criticized in the West. After this speech, many observers, 
especially in the United States, saw Putin as anti-Western and openly welcomed his successor in 
                                                 
11 See M. E. Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?” Foreign Affairs, 93 no 5 (September/October 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-
fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise (accessed 16 December 2014); Uwe Klussmann et al., “Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow?” Spiegel, 26 
November 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html 
(accessed 16 December 2009). For a thorough overview of the documentation, see Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, “NATO Expansion: 
What Gorbachev Heard”, National Security Archive, Briefing Book #613, 12 December 2017,  https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-
programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early (accessed 30 January 2018). 
 
12 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., “NATO Expansion: Was There a Promise?” JackMatlock.com, 3 April 2014, http://jackmatlock.com/2014/04/nato-
expansion-was-there-a-promise/ (accessed 11 June 2014). 
13 Roy A. Medvedev, Vremya Putina (Moscow: Vremya, 2014), 533, https://biography.wikireading.ru/187108 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
14 Alexander Kramarenko, “5 Reasons Why Russia Could Join NATO”, Moscow Times, 9 December 2010, 
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/5-reasons-why-russia-could-join-nato-3106 (accessed 16 June 2011). 
15 Medvedev, Vremya Putina, 533.  
16 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie i diskusii na Miunkhenshoi konferentsii po voprosam politiki bezopasnosti”, Kremlin.Ru, 10 February 2007, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/02/118109.shtml (accessed 16 June 2007). 
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office, Dmitry Medevedev.17 That Medvedev did indeed come to office with an agenda of 
rapprochement with the West, is suggested by his selection of Germany for his first official state 
visit as president, and his remarks to the German Bundestag, where he reminded his audience 
that ‘Russian and European democracy share common roots. We share the same set of values and 
the same sources of law: Roman, Germanic and French law…. We have a common history and 
we share the same humanitarian values. This common thinking is the foundation that enables us 
to speak not just the same legal or business language today but, I hope, also the same political 
language’.18                  
 
The Russo-Georgian conflict that erupted just months after Medvedev’s inauguration, however, 
put the final nail in the coffin of any possible closeness with the West. The West’s indifference 
to the fact that the Georgian Army had initiated hostilities, and to the plight of thousands of 
South Ossetians streaming over Russia’s border for protection, led to universal outrage in Russia. 
Many regime opponents, noted human right activists, and even jailed oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, all voiced support for Russian intervention in Georgia.19  
 
Prior to the events of August 2008, Russian elites tended to regard U.S. unilateralism as an 
unfortunate, but understandable overreaction to the shock of 9/11. After Georgia, they would 
come to see it as a new strategy of containment, directed against Russia.  
 
President Medvedev responded to this new domestic consensus by listing five core principles that 
would henceforth guide Russian foreign policy: 
 
• First: the primacy of the basic principles of international law.  
• Second: Multipolarity. The pursuit of unipolarity is unacceptable.   
• Third: Russia will not seek confrontation with any country, but will not isolate itself. 
• Fourth: Russia’s priority is to protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they 
are, and to protect the interest of its business community abroad.  
• Fifth: Russia, like other nations, has regions with which it has traditionally had especially 
cordial and privileged relations, and it will seek to expand these relations. 20 
 
Still, when Medvedev signed off on a new national security strategy the following May, it did not 
presage any fundamental shift in Russian foreign policy. It continued to emphasize the quality of 
life, economic growth, science and education, health care, culture, and preservation of the 
environment. Of seven indicators used to measure national security listed in article 112, only two 
dealt with military matters.21 
                                                 
17 John McCain, “Vladimir Putin Is an Evil Man”, Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-mccain-vladimir-putin-
is-an-evil-man-1525964549  (accessed 6 June 2018); ‘The John B. Hurford Memorial Lecture with Michael McFaul’, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 11 May 2018, https://www.cfr.org/event/john-b-hurford-memorial-lecture-michael-mcfaul (accessed 6 June 2018).  
18 Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders,” Kremlin.Ru, 5 June 2008, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
19 “Russia's use of force in South Ossetia is justified, says party leader”, Interfax, 10 August 2008, cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-no 146, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 25 August 2008); Fred Weir et al., "Roots of Georgia-Russia clash run deep”, Christian Science 
Monitor, 12 August 2008, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0812/p01s08-woeu.html (accessed 16 August 2008); “Khodorkovsky 
odobril deistviya Medvedeva v Yuzhnoi Osetii”, Obshchaya gazeta, 11 September  2008, http://og.ru:8080/news/2008/09/11/41296 (accessed 20 
September 2008). 
20 “Medvedev sets out five foreign policy principles in TV interview”, BBC Monitoring, 31 August 2008, cited in Johnson's Russia List 2008-no 
163, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 4 September 2008). 
21 “Strategiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda, Polit.ru, 6 October 2009, 
http://www.polit.ru/dossie/2009/05/13/security.html (accessed 16 October 2009). 




Moreover, in a foreign policy speech he gave in July 2010, Medvedev added a distinctly Western 
tilt to Russian foreign policy, when he said that Russia intends to pursue ‘special modernisation 
alliances’ with its main international partners—Germany, France, Italy, the European Union, and 
the United States—to create ‘incentives for integration based on shared modernisation 
imperatives’.22 Eventually, but only later, a similar approach would be designed for China and 
India. 
 
But when Putin was re-elected president in 2012, he signed off on a very different foreign policy 
concept, that shifted attention to the role that spiritual and cultural values play in world affairs.23 
 
Russia’s Conservative Mission Civilisatrice 
 
Putin used the occasion of the annual meeting with leading Russia specialists in Valdai in 2013 
to talk about the importance of traditional values in Russian foreign policy.24 There, for the first 
time, he went beyond his longstanding criticism of unipolarity to explain what values Russia 
stood for. It was a statement of Russia’s mission to the world in the 21st century. 
 
Putin began by noting that countries cannot merely rely on foreign models; they must do 
everything in their power to preserve their own, distinct identities. ‘Without [such] spiritual, 
cultural and national self-definition . . . . one cannot succeed globally’. 
 
So, while Russia must be strong militarily, technologically, and economically, the most 
important components of national success, Putin argued, are the intellectual, spiritual, and moral 
state of its people. Russia’s influence will depend on how much its citizens feel that they are one 
people, sharing a common history, common values, and common traditions.  
 
Free markets alone cannot generate such a sense of unity. Neither can a laissez faire approach to 
government. What Russia needs, says Putin, is a creative synthesis of the best examples from the 
nation’s history and intellectual past, gleaned from a variety of cultural, spiritual, and political 
perspectives. A diversity of sources is crucial, Putin told his audience, because Russia has, from 
its inception, been a multinational and multiconfessional state. 
 
In fact, Putin argued, cultural pluralism is destined to be one of Russia’s main contribution to 
global development. ‘We have amassed a unique experience of interacting with, mutually 
enriching, and mutually respecting diverse cultures. Polyculturalism and poly-ethnicity are in our 
consciousness, our spirit, our historical DNA [исторический код]’, says Putin. Russia’s 
‘effervescent complexity’ [цветущая сложность] he says, citing the nineteenth century 
                                                 
22 Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations”, Kremlin.Ru, 
12 July 2010, cited in Johnson's Russia List 2010-#135, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ (accessed 8 October 2010). With this speech 
Medvedev confirmed the authenticity of a classified foreign policy memo, published by Russian Newsweek in May, entitled “Let the Sun Shine 
In.” Konstantin Gaaze and Mikhail Zygar, “Pust’ opyat’ budet Solntse,” Newsweek (Russia) 9 May 2010, http://perevodika.ru/articles/13593.html 
(accessed 6 June 2018). The full text of this document, “A Program for the Effective and Systematic Use of Foreign Policy Factors for Long 
Term Development of the Russian Federation,” is available at http://www.flot2017.com/file/show/normativeDocuments/24231 (accessed 6 June 
2018). 
23 Vladimir Putin, “Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2013, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F (accessed 16 June 2013). 
24 Vladimir Putin, “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai”, Kremlin.ru, 19 November 2013,   
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243(accessed 16 December 2013). 
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conservative philosopher Konstantin Leontyev, is enhanced by the framework of Russian 
language, culture, and traditional religions, and define Russia’s distinctiveness as a ‘civilization-
state’.25   
 
Today, the greatest challenge to cultural pluralism emanates from the West, specifically from 
those parts of it that have rejected traditional cultural identity, even the values of Christianity that 
form the basis of Western civilization. The unipolar, monolithic and increasingly secular world 
that some in the West would seek to impose on others, says Putin, is ‘a rejection . . . of the 
natural diversity of the world granted by God. . . . [for] without the values of Christianity and 
other world religions, without the norms of morality and ethics formed over the course of 
thousands of years, people inevitably lose their human dignity’.  Russia, he says, will defend 
these Christian moral principles, both at home and abroad.26  
 
At Valdai, Putin officially declared that the post-Soviet era was over for Russia. Echoing the 
remarks of 19th century Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov, Russia, he said that 
Russia is returning to itself, to its own past, while remaining open and receptive to the best ideas 
of both East and West.27 
 
Ukraine: From ‘Priority Partnership’ to War  
 
While alluding only briefly to the geopolitical ramifications of the traditionalist turn that he was 
proposing, Putin had already, back in 2011, committed Russia to the creation of a Eurasian 
Union, a project that he described as designed to ‘move the Eurasian heartland from the 
periphery of global development to its center’.28 For him, clearly, Russia’s great Slavic neighbor 
to the South, Ukraine, was to be a key player in this Union. Throughout his career, Putin has 
made no bones about his view that, while they may now be two separate nations, Russians and 
Ukrainians are essentially one people.29 To his mind, the struggles that Ukraine has endured 
since its independence, mirrored the struggles that Russia had undergone the previous decade, 
only exacerbated by Ukrainian nationalism. 
 
As a result, political power in Ukraine alternated between its Eastern (Russophone) and Western 
(Ukrainophone) regions, each seeking to prevent the other side from implementing its maximum 
political and cultural agenda. The resulting political gridlock was Ukraine’s way of avoiding 
civil war, which many believed would erupt if either side were to dominate completely, and turn 
its version of Ukrainian identity into a test of civic loyalty. 
 
President Victor Yanukovych’s removal from office on 22 February 2014 upset the delicate political 
balance between Galicia and Donbass, and was therefore perceived as a direct threat to the core 
interest of Russophone Ukrainians. Two-thirds of Donbass residents surveyed in April 2014 said they 
                                                 
25 Putin seems to be echoing Jose Manuel Barroso, then president of the European Commission, who had earlier that year referred to Russia as “a 
civilization veiled as a nation”. “Speech by President Barroso at the Russia-European Union – Potential for Partnership conference: Moving into 
a Partnership of Choice”, Europa.eu, 21 March 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-249_en.htm (accessed 16 June 2013). 
26 Putin, “Zasedanie”. 
27 Gorchakov’s recueillement as a theme in Russian diplomatic history is discussed by Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to 
Putin: Honor in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 137-155. 
28 Vladimir Putin, “Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Evrazii”, Izvestiya, 3 October 2011, https://iz.ru/news/502761 (accessed 16 October 2011). 
29 “Bolshaya press-konferentsiya Vladimira Putina”, Kremlin.ru, 14 December 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56378 (accessed 26 
December 2017). 
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regarded the Maidan as ‘an armed overthrow of the government, organized by the opposition with the 
assistance of the West’.30 Recent surveys suggest that that number has scarcely changed since the 
beginning of the conflict.31 
 
The new authorities in Kiev’s ham fisted efforts to revoke the language law passed by the Ukrainian 
parliament in 2012, which allowed the official use of local language in regions where at least ten 
percent spoke it, provoked a violent response in regions where Russian language and culture are 
seen as part of Ukrainian identity. With Russia’s support, Crimea voted for secession from Ukraine, 
then annexation by Russia. In the easternmost segments of Donbass, the conflict still rages. 
 
The crisis in Ukraine marks a crucial step in the emergence of what many are now calling ‘the 
New Cold War’. While Western political leaders typically describe Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
as offensive and a challenge to the post-war order, their Russian counterparts typically describe 
their actions as defensive, both in terms of preserving the rights of local residents, and in terms 
of preserving the country’s vital strategic interests in the Black Sea.32 This division has been 
exacerbated by the approach that each side has taken in resolving this conflict. Although both 
Russia and the West says they want political and social stability in Ukraine, they disagree 
strongly about how that stability can be achieved.   
 
By and large, Western leaders remain ignorant of, and indifferent to, the cultural differences 
within Ukraine, even though these differences once led professor Samuel P. Huntington to 
describe Ukraine as a ‘cleft country’, and to presciently single out Crimea as a region of 
particular contention.33 Today, most Western leaders simply assert that, if corruption is reduced 
and the economy grows, the cultural divisions of past centuries will simply fade away, and a new 
political and social consensus develop. Ambassador Kurt Volker, the latest U.S. special 
representative on Ukraine, takes this view to its most inane extreme, saying: “As I’ve said 
before, the only place in Ukraine where Russian-speakers are at risk is where there are Russian 
soldiers”.34 
 
Russia, on the other hand, views post-Soviet Ukraine as a culturally fragmented society. 
Stability, it argues, can be achieved only if political authorities there accept the bi-cultural nature 
of Ukraine, and create a constitutional framework that grants the country’s major cultural 
constituencies equal rights.35  
                                                 
30 “Mneniya i vzglyadi zhitelei you-vostoka Ukrainy: Aprel 2014”, Zerkalo nedeli, 18 April 2014, https://zn.ua/article/print/UKRAINE/mneniya-
i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html (accessed 16 June 2014). 
31 “Zhiteli Yuga Ukrainy schitayut Evromaidan perevorotom. . . “, Timer Odessa, 14 February 2017, http://timer-
odessa.net/news/jiteli_yuga_ukraini_schitayut_maydan_perevorotom_i_veryat_chto_voyna_na_donbasse_vigodna_kievu_849.html (accessed 16 
April 2017); “Kazhdyi pyatyi zhitel Yuga i Vostoka podderzhivayut avtonomiyu okkupirovannogo Donbassa--opros”, Institut massovoi 
informatsii, 4 July 2017, http://imi.org.ua/news/kojen-pyatiy-meshkanets-pivdnya-ta-shodu-pidtrimue-avtonomiyu-okupovanogo-donbasu-
opituvannya-2/ (accessed 16 July 2017). See also the explanation in footnote 51. 
32 Eduard Steiner, “Um zu überleben, muss Russland siegen”, interview mit Sergej Karaganow, Die Presse, 12 November 2017,  
https://diepresse.com/home/ausland/aussenpolitik/5318661/Um-zu-ueberleben-muss-Russland-siegen?from=suche.intern.portal (accessed 6 June 
2018); Vladislav Surkov, “Odinochestvo polukrovki (14+)” Rossiya v globalnoi politike, 9 April 2018, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/print/global-
processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
33 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2007), 138. The U.S. 
Special representative on Ukraine, Kurt Volker, has taken this view to its most absurd extreme by saying “As I’ve said before, the only place in 
Ukraine where Russian-speakers are at risk is where there are Russian soldiers” Волкер: единственное опасное место в Украине – где 
находятся российские солдаты Sharij.net, 13 April 2018, https://sharij.net/114485 (accessed 6 June 2018). 
34 “Volker: edinstvennoe opasnoe mesto v Ukraine—gde nakohodiatsy rossiiskie soldaty”, Sharij.net, 13 April 2018, https://sharij.net/114485 
(accessed 6 June 2018). 
35 Christopher Harress, “Vladimir Putin Urges Donetsk And Luhansk To Remain Part Of Ukraine”, International Business Times, 6 June 2015, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/vladimir-putin-urges-donetsk-luhansk-remain-part-ukraine-1955758 (accessed 6 June 2015) ; “Russia FM suggests 




These constitutional reforms are laid out in a comprehensive political settlement known colloquially 
as the Minsk Accords.36 By institutionalizing regional autonomy, the Accords are meant to guarantee 
a modicum of regional political and cultural pluralism within Ukraine. It is this aspect of the Accords 
that Ukrainian nationalists object to most strongly, since they fear that it will undermine national 
unity.37  
 
This conflict has fundamentally altered Russia’s foreign policy toward Ukraine. Instead of seeking a 
‘priority partnership’ with Ukraine as it did in 2012, Russia’s most recent national security 
documents now say that ties must be based on ‘mutual respect’ and strict attention to each other’s 
national interests.38 In Ukraine many have interpreted this as a sign that Russia is turning its back on 
Ukraine, a prospect that some view with delight, others with alarm because of its potentially 
devastating consequences for the Ukrainian economy.39 
 
The fallout from this conflict has also reinforced negative stereotypes toward the West in Russia, 
where many see events in Ukraine as the logical culmination of Western policies aimed at regime 
change in the countries of the former Soviet Union. From this perspective, Ukraine is not the issue 
that must be resolved so that relations with the West can improve. Rather, it is an issue that, if 
resolved, will show that the West is sincere about wanting better relations with Russia. Since the 
chances of this happening are seen as slim to non-existent, some influential Russian policy analysts, 
like the aforementioned Vladislav Surkov, have recently suggested that, after four centuries of 
fruitless efforts, Russia’s efforts to be seen as part of European civilization may now be over.40 
 
From this perspective, the root problem in relations with the West has been the animosity western 
elites have displayed for centuries, first toward the Russia Empire, then toward the Soviet Union, 
and now toward post-Soviet Russia.41 Consequently, as Russia has begun to emphasize its own 
distinctive values, tensions with the West have inevitably heightened. These distinctive values 
derive in no small measure from the unique role played by the Russian Orthodox Church.  
 
Russia’s Conservative Restoration: Soft Power and the Orthodox Church 
 
After he was elected as president for a third time in 2012, Putin undertook the customary foreign 
policy review.42 According to this document, the global balance of power is clearly shifting from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ukraine dialogue under OSCE auspices”, Fox News, 1 May 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/01/russia-fm-suggests-ukraine-
dialogue-under-osce-auspices.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
36 “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, OSCE, 12 February 2015, http://www.osce.org/cio/140156, points 9 
and 10 (accessed 16 February 2016). 
37 Katharine Quinn-Judge, “To Reunite Ukraine, Kyiv Must Overcome Its Own Prejudices”, International Crisis Group, 20 March 2018, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/reunite-ukraine-kyiv-must-overcome-its-own-prejudices (accessed 16 
April 2018). 
38 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 30.11.2016 № 640 “Ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Official 
Government Internet Portal for Legal Information, 1 December 2016,  http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612010045 
(accessed 16 June 2017). 
39 Nicolai N. Petro, “Why Russia and Ukraine Need Each Other”, Russian Politics, vol.1. No, 2, June 2016, 184-202, 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/24518921-00102004;jsessionid=2nsjuukv6xa0v.x-brill-live-03 (accessed 6 June 
2018). 
40 In  “Odinochestvo polukrovki” Rossiya v globalnoi politike. 
41 In his latest essay, Vladislav Surkov laments the ‘end of Russia’s epic journey to the West, the demise of the multiple but fruitless attempts to 
become part of European civilization’. “Odinochestvo polukrovki”, Rossiya v global’noi politike, 9 April 2018, 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/print/global-processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
42 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 February 2013, 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 (accessed 1 May 2018). 
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West to the Asia-Pacific region. Western powers will seek to prevent this, resulting in heightened 
regional tensions, lower economic growth rates, and the fracturing of long established trade 
associations and alliances.  
 
Because the danger of global chaos along this trajectory is so high, Russia must do everything in its 
power to forge a more pluralistic international order. One of its main tools for doing so will be 
Russian soft power, whose appeal stems largely from the fact that, in contrast to American soft 
power, it does not envision the new world order as merely an extension of American values.43  
 
But since Russia has begun to promote a more values-oriented foreign policy, it has also argued 
that certain values, if adopted as principles of behavior, are more congenial to international order 
than others. These are not the values of any one community or culture, but they do exist, and can 
be gleaned from the values shared by the world’s largest and oldest religious communities--
Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.44  
 
But if Russian soft power is about cultural pluralism, how does one account for the increasingly 
prominent role of the Russian Orthodox Church, both at home and abroad? According to Russian 
officials, there is less of a tension between the two than might appear. Many ancient civilizations 
of the Middle East and North Africa, they say, are ‘returning to their roots’. Such a return does 
not presume values developing in isolation, but rather the forging a common values framework, 
which all the world’s major religions have in common. 
 
Russia’s soft power is thus conceived around the premise that a better world order can only be 
forged around respect for all values, even mutually incompatible ones. It is thus tied not to any 
distinct set of values which are then projected globally by a specific nation, but to cultural diversity 
itself.45 To use Isaiah Berlin’s terminology, while American soft power aspires to positive freedom 
someday replacing the more limited notion of negative freedom, Russian soft power sees culture as 
setting firm boundaries on both negative and positive aspirations for freedom.46   
 
Russia’s new emphasis on values generally, and on religious values in particular, has led to 
numerous areas of friction with the West. The first involves the very nature of the international 
order. Since the rise human rights and democracy as explicit U.S. foreign policy objectives in the 
1970s, western political leaders have often argued that Western foreign policy ought mirror its 
domestic politics. That is because, according to the popular theory known as ‘democratic peace 
theory’, democracies do not go to war with each other. States that promote democracy are 
                                                 
43 On the relationship of American exceptionalism to the spreading of American values, see Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, “Restoring American 
Exceptionalism”, Wall Street Journal, 28 August 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/restoring-american-exceptionalism-1440801129 (accessed 
16 June 2016); and Hillary Clinton, “Why America Is Exceptional”, Time, 13 October 2016, http://time.com/4521509/2016-election-clinton-
exceptionalism/?xid=homepage (accessed 16 December 2016). For a critique, see Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “The Bitter Fruits of Wilsonianism”, The 
American Conservative, 31 March 2017, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-bitter-fruits-of-wilsonianism/?print=1; and 
Andrew J. Bacevich, “Angst in the Church of America the Redeemer”, Salon, 25 February 2017,  http://www.salon.com/2017/02/25/angst-in-the-
church-of-america-the-redeemer_partner/ (accessed 16 June 2017). 
44 “Poseshcenie Sretenskogo monastyrya—Prezident Rossii”, Kremlin.ru, 25 May 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54573 (accessed 
6 June 2018). 
45 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 February 2013, paragraphs 20 and 39 (m). 
46 “Two Concepts of Liberty” was Berlin's inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Political and Social Theory at Oxford University, delivered 31 
October 1958. It is available on line, with the author’s annotations, at The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library,  
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/tcl/ (accessed 16 June 2007). Berlin saw both types of liberty as susceptible to extreme interpretations. 
Negative freedom--to the failure to grasp that “democratic self-government is a fundamental human need, something valuable in itself”. Positive 
freedom--to paternalistic abuse by elites willing to runs rough-shod over pluralism and diversity. Isaiah Berlin, Five Essays on Liberty (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-2. 
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therefore promoting a morally desirable international order, whereas states that object to such 
efforts are deemed immoral.   
  
A second source of friction stems from the frustration of some western governments with the 
extent to which international institutions are willing to promote democracy and human rights. 
The United States and its allies have sought ways around these institutions by asserting that 
western values are the de facto, if not yet de jure, international standard. Thus, when several 
western nations decide to act in concert, as in the case of Iraq or Syria, it is said that they do not 
require any explicit mandate from the United Nations. This has been a source of considerable 
friction between Russia and the West.   
  
A third source of friction is the very fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is so closely 
partnered with the state. With respect to Russian foreign policy, the ROC supports the 
government’s objective of creating a ‘congenial international order’ that, it believes, it will assist 
the Church it in its threefold salvific mission--to save individual souls, to save all national 
cultures that have been baptized into Christ, and to save all mankind. Needless to say, this is as 
far from the doctrine of separation of Church and State, as East is from West.47       
  
The values-based contours of the present East-West conflict can be readily seen in Russia’s 
opposition to the notion that Western cultural values are the standard for international behavior. 
Russia regards this as unilateralism, and believes that a multipolar world order based on 
pluriculturalism is a more desirable alternative. 
  
Pluriculturalism asserts that there is an inherent (‘God-given’ according to Vladimir Putin) value 
to diversity among nations.48 Pluriculturalism is distinct from multiculturalism, which values 
diversity within nations. Russia assigns diversity within nations a lower priority than it does 
diversity among nations. By contrast, Western states typically give greater weight to diversity 
within nations (the rights of the individual), whereas among nations, they seek to subordinate 
national cultural differences to standards such as human rights, that express modern western 
values. 
  
But while some political friction fallout from such a pronounced conflict of visions is inevitable, 
it should be possible to prevent this conflict of ideals from spilling over into outright ideological 
hostility. One way to do so might be to look at this distinction in a broader context.  
 
Russian pluriculturalists argue that national cultural distinctions should impose certain limits on 
a nation’s foreign policy ambitions. It is worth noting that this was, in fact, the original meaning 
of ‘American exceptionalism’ —the idea, as John Quincy Adams put it, that America does not 
go overseas ‘in search of monsters to destroy’.49 
 
Nor is the Orthodox Church’s moral framework quite as ‘anti-modern’ or ‘anti-liberal’ as it 
appears to be at first blush. The writings of senior Russian clergy are typically quite nuanced, 
                                                 
47 Nicolai N. Petro, “The Orthodox Church”, in Andrei Tsygankov, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 
2018), 217-232. 
48 Putin, “Zasedanie”. 
49 John Quincy Adams, “She Goes Not Abroad in Search of Monsters to Destroy”, The American Conservative, 4 July 2013, 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/repository/she-goes-not-abroad-in-search-of-monsters-to-destroy/ (accessed 16 August 2013). 
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arguing that both the Enlightenment and liberalism were valuable and progressive social ideals in 
their day, but that having abandoned the moral framework provided by the Christianity they have 
deformed and become monstrous.50 
  
What the Orthodox Church does reject, and this wholeheartedly, is the cultural dominance of 
secularism. The fact that contemporary western societies tend to regard secularism, along with 
modernity and liberalism, as forming the quintessential western trinity of values, is something 
that the Russian Orthodox Church is especially keen to reverse.  
 
Finally, one should never lose sight of the fact that the Church sees itself, first and foremost, as a 
supernatural actor -- the manifestation of the Holy Spirit in history. Political battles have scant 
meaning when one is competing for the very soul of mankind. This latter is the only struggle that 
has meaning for the Church. It is its very raison d’etre, and its outcome will not be decided by 
the struggle among nations, but by the struggle that goes on within men’s souls.  
 
But while the focus on traditional morality and Orthodox values might appeal domestically, as a 
foreign policy strategy its allure seems limited. Among Russia’s immediate neighbors, for example, 
the response has been mixed. While there are still many who view the Soviet era with nostalgia, and 
regard the break of the USSR as more harmful than beneficial (sometimes by wide margins, as in 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and portions of Ukraine), it is not at all clear that the Orthodox 
Church’s conservative social vision appeals to the same degree.51  
 
The overall effectiveness Russian soft power is therefore best gauged in the context of a Russia’s 
proposed foreign policy alternative --civilizational realism 
 
‘Civilizational Realism’: Russia’s New Approach to International Relations? 
 
The previous discussion of values and morality sheds a rather different light on some widely held 
Western assumptions about Russian foreign policy. The first, is that Russia rejects the post-Cold 
War international order. This is not correct. Russia fears global chaos, and believes that efforts to 
preserve the global hegemony of the West will exacerbate tensions and lead to a breakdown of the 
international order. That is why Russia places such a high value on the international order. To the 
extent that it is rooted in the supremacy of international law and under the guidance of UN Security 
Council, it mitigates chaos.52   
 
                                                 
50 (Ryabykh), Hegumen Philip (Ryabykh),“Russky mir—eto tsivilizatsionnaya obshchnost. . .”, 17 June 2010, Patriarchia.ru, 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/26208.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
51 Neli Esipova and Julie Ray. "Former Soviet Countries See More Harm From Breakup”. Gallup.com, 19 December 2013. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/166538/former-soviet-countries-harm-breakup.aspx?version=print (accessed 16 June 2014). “Dazhe bez Kryma i 
Donbassa storonnikov SSSR v Ukraine okazalos bolshe chem protivnikov”, Narodnyi correspondent, 16 March 2018, 
http://nk.org.ua/ukraina/daje-bez-kryima-i-donbassa-storonnikov-sssr-v-ukraine-okazalos-bolshe-chem-ego-protivnikov-
136050?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fzen.yandex.com (accessed 16 April 2018). 
52 As Dmitry Trenin notes, Russia has offered no alternative design to what exists today and no comprehensive reform blueprint. It is not the 
world order as such that Moscow has challenged, but the U.S. domination of that order.  He illustrates by saying that “the UN Security Council 
has always been the right model for the Russians, while the NATO-Russia Council has not for this very reason”, “Looking out Five Years: What 
Should Washington and Its European Allies Expect From Moscow?” Carnegie Moscow Center, 24 August 2017, 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/72813 (accessed 16 September  2017). 
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How does Russia reconcile this with the annexation of Crimea, support for the rebellion in Donbass, 
and allegations that it is engaging in “hybrid warfare” against the US and Europe? Primarily through 
denials and legal counterarguments for its actions. 
 
Russia’s legal position on Crimea is that, although the Ukrainian constitution prohibits local 
referenda on secession, this is trumped by under the UN Charter (article 1), which stipulates that 
people have the right to self-determination. Russia changed its position on this following the 
decision of July 22, 2010 by the International Court of Justice to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence from Serbia. At the time the US State Department filed a brief in support of 
Kosovo, arguing that ‘there was no general rule [because] these were political acts’. They were 
therefore worthy of recognition because declaring independence had created a new ‘political 
reality’ in the region.53  
 
Russia, which had originally opposed this ICJ ruling, later found it quite congenial for its 
approach to Ukraine. It now argues that Ukrainians living in Crimea and Donbass have the same 
right to determine their allegiance that Kosovars did when they were living in Serbia, and that 
the Crimean referendum of March 16, 2014 overwhelmingly ratified that decision. 
 
The vast majority of international legal experts, however, argue that this referendum was 
illegitimate because Russia facilitated the ability of Crimean authorities to hold such a 
referendum with masked military intervention.54 In response, Russia makes two 
counterarguments. First, on the charge that the presence of Russian troops invalidates the 
referendum, it argues that responsibility for law and order at the polling stations was born by 
local self-defense forces and people's volunteers, and that the Russian troop presence ensured 
only that the referendum could take place.55 
 
Second, to the point that the Ukrainian Constitution states that the separation of a part of the 
country's territory cannot be subject to a local referendum, Crimean officials point out that the 
authorities in Kiev had already revoked the acting Ukrainian Constitution on February 21st and 
reinstated the 1996 constitution. This was done in one day, without any judicial review, and as 
such was illegal. The Crimean government responded by assuming control until ‘constitutional 
order’ was restored in Kiev, and began negotiations with Kiev.56 When those failed, Crimean 
                                                 
53 Harold H. Koh, “The International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence” U.S. Department of State 
(archived), FPC Briefing on 22 July 2010, https://2009-2017-fpc.state.gov/145040.htm (accessed 16 June 2011). 
54 Notable dissenters include Reinhard Merkel, professor of law and legal philosophy at the University of Hamburg, “Die Krim und das 
Völkerrecht. Kühle Ironie der Geschichte”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 April 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/die-
krim-und-das-voelkerrecht-kuehle-ironie-der-geschichte-12884464.html?printPagedArticle=trueno pageIndex_2; Michael Geistlinger, professor 
of law at the University of Salzburg (Austria), “Der Beitritt der Republik Krim zur Russländischen Föderation aus der Warte des 
Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker”, Archiv des Völkerrechts, 52, no 2 (June 2014): 175-204; and Peter Ørebech, professor of law at the 
University of Tromsø (Norway), “International law and the Crimea”, Radikal Portal, 8 June 2017. https://is.gd/IzeAsd. Noted American jurist 
Eric Posner has argued that the equities in this case, as in other cases of separatism, are “complicated”, and that “the secession of Crimea, good or 
bad, is now an accomplished fact”. “What to do About Crimea. Nothing” Slate, 27 March 2014. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/03/sanctions_against_russia_why_everything_we_are_doing_about_c
rimea_is_completely.html (accessed 16 February 2018). 
55 Merkel, “Die Krim und das Völkerrecht”.  
56 The trial in absentia of former president Viktor Yanukovych is bringing to light more and more new details about the actions of the Ukrainian 
government during those days. Parliamentarian Nestor Shufrich was delegated to head negotiations with the new Crimean leadership. On 28 
February 2014 he met with Crimean leaders and worked out an agreement that would keep Crimea in Ukraine by restoring the Crimean 
constitution of 1992, without the Crimean presidency. A delegation was scheduled to arrive on Monday, March 3rd to work out the final text. By 
Monday morning, however, the Prosecutor General Makhnitsky had received orders to issue an arrest warrant for Crimean leaders Konstantinov 
and Aksyonov, to which Aksyonov responded by taking over control of government institutions in Crimea. Taras Kozub, “V vozdukhe povis 
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authorities acted in accordance with their view that Crimean sovereignty had been restored to the 
status quo ante 1992, and this was the issue put to the people in the March referendum.57  
 
For Russia, the accusation of clandestine support for the rebellion in Donbass, and hybrid 
warfare against the West are not legal, but political in nature. With respect to Donbass, Russia 
has consistently rejected all accusations that its troops are fighting there, although it does 
acknowledge assisting in humanitarian relief efforts there. The same is true of Western 
accusations of cyber warfare and the intentional manipulation of elections. Moreover, in the 
latter instance, Russia argues that it has long been a proponent of the need for international 
treaties to safeguard countries from such interference.58 
 
The bottom line is that Russia is not rejecting the traditional international framework of conflict 
resolution. Rather, by making its counterarguments within the same framework, it is reaffirming its 
importance. This is the antithesis of the Soviet approach, which regarded the the entire ‘bourgeois’ 
legal and international system as illegitimate, even though in practice it often continued to abide by 
it.59    
 
A second common assumption is that Russia seeks to undermine the ‘liberal U.S. led order’. In fact, 
Russia expects the US to remain the leader of the liberal, western model of global development. 
This model, however, must learn to co-exist with other models. Russian analysts often make the 
analogy to institutional religions. These can coexist peacefully, so long as they do not seek to 
impose their view of the Truth on others, and respect each other’s value to humanity’s cultural 
diversity. As Russia sees it, in the future there will be multiple centers of power, each believing 
itself no less moral than any other. Clinging to a messianic view of liberalism and American 
exceptionalism only serves to isolates the West, says Russia, and while U.S. leadership is likely to 
fade in a more pluralistic world, liberalism need not be dragged down along with it.  
 
Russia, therefore, sees itself as that part of the West that understands the futility of ‘liberal 
fundamentalism’, to use Boris Mezhuev’s felicitous phrase, and therefore seeks to establish a 
framework of global leadership around the values that the West shares with non-Western states. 
Prominent political theorist Mezhuev has called this ‘civilizational realism’.60 
  
Civilizational realism differs from classical realism in that it recognizes the importance of values in 
international affairs. It differs from classical liberalism in that it sees value in the diversity of 
cultural communities, as well as individuals. Russia’s approach can therefore best be described not 
                                                                                                                                                             
vopros: kto sdal Krym?” Vesti, 8 February2018, https://vesti-ukr.com/strana/276905-v-vozdukhe-povis-vopros-kto-sdal-krym-kak-prokhodili-
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57 “Crimea referendum: What does the ballot paper say?” BBC News, 10 March 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26514797 
(accessed 16 June 2014). 
58  Jeremy Kirk, “Russia Pushes for UN Resolution on Cyberspace”, PC World, 3 October 2011.  
https://www.pcworld.com/article/240983/russia_pushes_for_un_resolution_on_cyberspace.html (accessed 16 June 2012); John Markoff and 
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59 The classical ideological statement of this approach is Leon Trotsky’s “Their Morals and Ours”, The New International, Vol.IV No.6, June 
1938, pp.163-173, https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm (accessed 6 June 2018); for its application to international 
law, see Evgeny Pashukanis, “International Law”, (1925) Marxists Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/1925/xx/intlaw.htm (accessed 6 June 2018). 
60 Boris Mezhuev, “O realizme i beregakh tsivilizatsii”, Vzglyad, 13 January 2017,  http://www.vz.ru/columns/2017/1/13/853243.print.html 
(accessed 16 June 2017). 
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as opposition to liberalism, but as a different form of liberalism, one that is divorced from Western 
hegemony and open to non-western traditions and influences.61   
 
We can now better understand the peculiar emphasis that Russia has placed on the spiritual and 
cultural aspects of international politics since 2013. There are both conceptual and practical reasons 
for this.  Conceptually, Russia’s cultural/moral/religious image--its ‘soft power’-- has emerged as an 
important resource in promoting domestic unity, as anticipated by the Putin Plan in the early 
2000s.62 
  
Additionally, it is now seen as a net benefit for Russian foreign policy. If soft power is thought of as 
the use of religious and/or cultural affinity to achieve foreign policy objectives, then many of 
Russia’s neighbors remain quite receptive to Russian soft power. Sometimes, as in Ukraine, 
Georgia, Bulgaria, and Moldova this is manifested in a ‘love-hate’ relationship that keeps Russia at 
the center of public attention, even as national elites desperately seek to distance their country from 
Russian cultural influence.63       
 
A November 2016 nationwide survey of Ukrainians revealed that 26% agree that Ukrainians and 
Russians are, as Putin likes to say, ‘one people’, while 51.1% say they are ‘brother nations’.64 A 
December 2017 survey revealed that a plurality, 36%, still regard the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
negative thing.65 And although the numbers looking to some type of economic and political alliance 
with Russia and Belarus have fallen sharply since 2014, after nearly four years of warfare they still 
hover around 20% nationwide, largely because of broad support in the Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine.66  
 
It is also important to note that surveys in Ukraine most likely understate the level of support for 
‘pro-Russian’ views. First, because they do not include Crimea and the rebel regions of Donbass. 
Were they included, Kiev based political analyst Kost’ Bondarenko believes it would shift the 
national results by as much as 10-15%.67 Second, because, increasingly, people in the East and 
South of Ukraine are reluctant to express their opinions to strangers.68 
                                                 
61 International relations theorist Giorgio Shani refers to this as establishing a ‘post-Western’ understanding of security which is tolerant of 
different conceptions of peace, freedom and dignity in different cultural traditions. On such a basis, different conceptions of security and IR 
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The real test for Russian soft power, however, will be whether it can shape preferences in areas 
of the globe that are not part of the traditional sphere of Russian cultural influence. Many are 
skeptical that Russian soft power, even one based on cultural diversity, can be very popular 
given the authoritarian nature of the regime.69  
 
This will certainly be true for those who make the nature of the Russian regime their primary 
criteria in dealing with Russia, and also for those who equate the international order with 
American leadership. But as that order has become increasingly chaotic, some Europeans have 
begun to equate Russia’s authoritarianism with stability and political competence, and worry 
more about Trump than Putin.70  
 
A poll in 2017 showed that majorities in Slovakia (75%), the Czech Republic (62%) and 
Hungary (54%) want closer security cooperation with Russia.71 Looking at the latest 
Eurobarometer poll, Anatoly Karlin suggests that we may be seeing a revival of ‘conservative 
Russophilia’ in southern and Eastern Europe.72 According to the editor of La Stampa, one of 
Italy’s major newspapers, ‘Nobody ever took this poll but I believe that if you were asking all 
Italians today who is the most popular foreign leader in all of Italy, Putin would win’.73 Putin’s 
overwhelming victory to a fourth term in office as president of Russia merely burnishes this 
image. 
 
To expand the reach of its soft power even further, therefore, Russia is likely to promote three 
themes. The first, is that it is alright for nations to be true to themselves. To succeed in the world, 
one does not have to move in lockstep with the western model of development. The rise of the 
BRICS, Russia argues, has proven that diverse approaches to development can compete very 
successfully with ‘the Washington Consensus’, and that local traditions can provide a reservoir 
of social resources that enhance a nation’s global competitiveness.74 
 
The second, is that it is alright for societies to challenge the ideal of a consumer oriented society. 
In many western and non-western societies, consumerism is blamed, not only for leading to 
resource, demographic, and ecological crises, but also to spiritual crises. The response has been 
to seek a sustainable, autochthonous source of spiritual development, upon which to build a 
sustainable, autochthonous form of economic development. This ties in with Russia’s third 
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theme--social conservatism--which has clearly struck a chord with conservative and religious 
groups in both Europe and America.75  
 
In a curious twist of politics and fate, one of the staunchest American proponents of the view 
Putin’s conservatism makes him ‘one of us’, is president Nixon’s former speechwriter, Patrick J. 
Buchanan. ‘Putin’, he writes, ‘may be seeing the future with more clarity than Americans still 
caught up in a Cold War paradigm. As the decisive struggle in the second half of the 20th 
century was vertical, East vs. West, the 21st century struggle may be horizontal, with 
conservatives and traditionalists in every country arrayed against the militant secularism of a 
multicultural and transnational elite’.76 More recently, he has said that, ‘Where America’s elites 
may celebrate same-sex marriage and ‘reproductive rights,’ more and more Europeans are 
identifying with the social values of Putin’s Russia. Pro-Putin parties are surging in Europe. Pro-
America parties have been facing losses and defections’.77 
 
Many liberally inclined western analysts cannot fathom why this would lead to a confluence of 
interests among countries as diverse as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. A better 
way to think of it is this--the soft power of the BRICS is an expression not of any one set of 
national values, but of the common values that they feel ought to underlie a new international 
order.  
 
Russia’s current moral framework fits this agenda like a glove, magnifying the impact of Russian 
soft power. Russia now believes that it can rely on a core constituency of states to assist it in the 
face of intense western hostility, since its efforts benefit not only Russia, but indirectly all 
nations that aspire to a new, pluricultural international order. 
 
There appears to be a growing consensus among analysts that America’s post-Cold War Russia 
policy has failed, and that the West bears at least part of the blame for this.78 Critics say that 
America succumbed to the temptation to utilize its ‘unipolar moment’ for unilateral advantage, and 
failed to propose a new model for international cooperation after the end the Cold War. In 
retrospect, the classic arguments of political realists about what happens to nations during periods of 
hyper-power appear to have been vindicated.79 In repeating these mistakes, America has been 
anything but exceptional.  
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For many others, however, Russia bears the lion’s share of the blame for the return of the Cold 
War, because it is trying to re-create the Soviet Union.80 But what Clinton and others see as 
merely a restoration of Soviet influence is actually something far more ambitious—the 
restoration of Russian power and influence, through the resurrection of traditional Russian mores 
and religious values. And with conservative traditionalism becoming a source of friction within 
so many European countries, there is the distinct possibility that a more traditional and religious 
Russia might someday find a way to bridge the ‘values gap’ with the West, not from the liberal 
end of the political spectrum, but from its conservative end.81 
 
Is there Life After Containment?   
 
At this writing, storm clouds are gathering once again over the European continent. Rather than 
coming together over conservative, or any other values, Russia and the West seem to be drifting 
further and further apart. One of the most astute Russian observers of European affairs, Sergei 
Karaganov, offers an intriguing analysis of why, and of what can be done about it. Karaganov 
serves as dean of the School of World Economics and World Politics at the National Research 
University-Higher School of Economics. He is also the honorary chairman of the Council on 
Foreign and Defense Policy, which he headed for many years. Karaganov’s views are especially 
noteworthy because he is, simultaneously, a Russian nationalist and a committed Europeanist, 
who views the European model of a global humanitarian order as highly attractive, and sees the 
potential return of a Europe of nation-states, as ‘a tragedy for Europe and a tragedy for Russia’.82 
 
Russia, which had been largely in balance with the rest of Europe for much of the twentieth 
century, was severely weakened by the demise of the Soviet Union, says Karaganov. During this 
time Europe adopted a short-sighted policy of trying to push Russia off the political, security and 
economic stage.83 Inevitably, however, balance was restored, and with it ‘normal politics’ (i.e., 
geopolitics) has returned. Putin began to pushback against threats to its vital national interests, 
and in doing so, Karaganov asserts, halted further Russian appeasement of the West, that would 
have most likely culminated in war.84 
 
America meanwhile has been turning inward. This tendency, Karaganov believes, began during 
president Obama’s second term, and is accelerating under president Trump. Such a withdrawal, 
Karaganov feels, is bad Russia, because it needs a functioning partner, not a paralyzed one. It is 
also bad for Russia relations with the EU because, Europe does not wish to bear the burden of 
paying for a new world order. Having concluded that neither the EU nor the United States will be 
a viable partner for Russia in the foreseeable future, Russia has moved on to Asia.  
                                                 
80 Before leaving office, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously accused Russia of seeking to ‘re-Sovietize’ its neighbors: ‘It's 
going to be called customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that’, she said, ‘but let's make no mistake about it. We know what the 
goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it’. Bradley Klapper, "Clinton fears efforts to 're-Sovietize' in 
Europe”. Associated Press, 6 December 2012.  
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ikCSVjy7h3ksmvpbqrMYZePvSdkQ?docId=06bc71ef2209439 (accessed 16 June 2017). 
81 On how the liberal bias in the study of soft power underestimate Russia’s potential in this arena, see Keating and Kaczmarska, “Conservative 
Soft Power”; and Nicolai N. Petro,  “The Surprising Allure of Russian Soft Power,” American Diplomacy vol. 3, (Spring 2018), 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2018/0406/ca_petro_russia.html (accessed 6 June 2018). 
82 “’Bez znaniya togo kak zhivet odna kletka, nevozmozhno ponyat, kak razvivaetsya organism’”, an interview with Sergei Karaganov in the 30th 
anniversary of the European Instititue of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sovremennaya Evropa, no 6 (2017), http://www.sov-
europe.ru/2017/06-2017/Karaganov-inter.pdf (accessed 16 August 2017). 
83 Sergei Karaganov, “New ideological struggle?” Russia in Global Affairs, 26 April 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/New-ideological-
struggle-18124 (accessed 16 May 2016). 
84 ’Bez znaniya”. 




‘Our Eurasian integrative project was initially aimed at utilizing the experience of European 
norms and institutions, to construct analogues to them around Russia, then to integrate these with 
Europe. Political circumstances did not permit this, and so now we will integrate with Asia. 
Later, step by step, perhaps, there will be a new convergence --now Eurasian--with Europe’.85 
 
Sadly, for Karaganov, America will have almost no role in this. While some in Moscow had high 
hopes for an improvement of relations under Donald Trump, these hopes have been dashed by 
the Trump administration’s prolonged inability to staff a coherent foreign policy team, and to 
separate his Russia policy from American domestic politics.   
 
There is, however, one important difference between the US and the EU, says Karaganov. 
Whereas in the former, anti-establishment sentiment is just as Russophobic as mainstream 
political sentiment, in the latter it is not. Parties like the Five Star Movement in Italy, the AfD in 
Germany, the Republicans in France, and Fidesz in Hungary, are all eager to re-establish normal 
trade and relations with Russia. There simply is no constituency that supports this in the United 
States.   
 
Taking Karaganov’s advice to heart, suggests that the way to end the vicious circle of 
recriminations between Europe and Russia is to recognize that the ‘values gap’, which has 
played such a prominent role is defining difference with Russia, is largely a matter of choice. 
European governments choose to emphasize differences with Russia that they choose to overlook 
in other Western countries. Meanwhile, India and China, whose cultural differences with Russia 
are far greater, have been able to reach a high degree of collaboration and consensus with Russia 
in international affairs. 
 
The international response to the latest poisoning incident in the United Kingdom involving 
Russia illustrates this divide yet again. While more than two dozen Western governments have 
expressed their solidarity with the UK, and expelled more than a hundred diplomats, India's 
former top diplomat said that such Western actions showed a ‘lack of sobriety [that] only raises 
suspicions about Britain's version and intentions’, while a leading Chinese daily described them 
as ‘nothing more than a form of Western bullying’.86  
 
To reach a modus vivendi with the West will therefore require a values breakthrough -- namely, the 
ability to envision Russia as a quintessential part of Europe. Ending Russia’s estrangement from 
Europe would lead, as the late German president Roman Herzog once put it, to the healing of 
Europe’s soul.87 At the end of such a process, Czech president Milos Zeman muses, tongue-in-
cheek, ‘Russia will become a member of the European Union. If you don't like that, then think of it 
this way: The European Union must join the Russian Federation’.88 
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